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ABSTRACT 
 This thesis examines the use of cyberspace operations by special operations forces 
to address the threats the United States faces from adversaries. Special operations forces 
need to conduct cyberspace operations to sustain their battlefield advantage, compete 
with adversary capabilities, and protect their personnel. Special operations forces are not 
fully resourced to conduct tactical-level cyberspace operations. A questionnaire was 
created to assess how well special operations forces were equipped with the capabilities 
and authorities to conduct cyberspace operations on their own and with the Joint Service. 
The questionnaire was delivered to special operations units, United States Special 
Operations Command (USSOCOM) elements, United States Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM) elements, and other cyberspace-related organizations in the 
Department of Defense (DOD). Analysis of the questionnaire concluded that several 
resourcing problems impede special operations forces from conducting cyberspace 
operations, including doctrinal problems at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. 
Recommendations are made to address the key policy and resourcing constraints. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. HYPOTHESIS............................................................................................2 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................2 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE ...........................................................................3 
D. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS ....................................................................3 
II. RELATED WORK ................................................................................................5 
A. CYBER STRATEGY ................................................................................6 
B. CYBER OPERATIONS ............................................................................7 
C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER OPERATIONS ...................11 
1. Administrative Obstacles ............................................................12 
2. Targeting Limitations ..................................................................13 
3. Collateral Limitations ..................................................................15 
4. Technical Limitations ..................................................................15 
III. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND RESULTS...................................................17 
A. QUESTIONNAIRE..................................................................................17 
B. QUESTIONS FOR USCYBERCOM AND SUBORDINATE 
ELEMENTS .............................................................................................17 
1. USCYBERCOM J2 Intelligence Division Questionnaire 
Responses ......................................................................................18 
2. Title 10 and Title 50 Authorities .................................................18 
3. Title 10, Title 50, and Unconventional Warfare ........................19 
C. QUESTIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS ........................20 
1. USSOCOM J3 Cyber Division Questionnaire Responses ........20 
2. USAFSOC Questionnaire Responses .........................................25 
3. Naval Special Warfare Special Reconnaissance Team 
TWO Responses ...........................................................................26 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................27 
IV. FINDINGS ............................................................................................................29 
A. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS ......29 
B. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS BY JOINT SERVICES ....................30 
C. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS BELOW THE STRATEGIC 
LEVEL ......................................................................................................31 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................................................33 
viii 
A. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL AND TACTICAL-LEVEL FORCE 
ALIGNMENT ...........................................................................................33 
B. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION .......................................34 
C. CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT ...........................................................34 
D. DOCTRINE ..............................................................................................35 
E. CONCLUSION .........................................................................................36 
APPENDIX A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTERVIEW KICK-OFF 
QUESTIONNAIRE..............................................................................................37 
APPENDIX B. SUPPORT AGENCY INTERVIEW KICK-OFF 
QUESTIONNAIRE..............................................................................................39 
SUPPLEMENTAL ...........................................................................................................41 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................43 




LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AFSOC Air Force Special Operations Command 
AISUM Artificial Intelligence for Small Unit Maneuver 
CCIR Commanders Critical Information Requirements 
CO-IPE Cyberspace Operations Integrated Planning Element 
CONOP concept of operation 
DOD Department of Defense 
DODIN Department of Defense Information Network 
DOTMLPF doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, 
facilities 
FRAGO fragmentation order 
JCIDS Joint Capability Integration and Development System 
JIPOE Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 
JSOC Joint Special Operations Command 
MARFORCYBER Marines Forces Cyber Command 
MARSOC Marine Special Operations Command 
NAVSPEC- 
WARCOM  Naval Special Warfare Command 
NITRD Networking and Information Technology Research and 
Development 
NSPM National Security Presidential Memorandum 
OPORD operation order 
PED process, exploit, disseminate 
PPD Presidential Policy Directive 
USAFRICOM United States Africa Command 
USASOC United States Army Special Operations Command 
USCENTCOM United States Central Command 
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command 
USPACOM United States Pacific Command 
USSOCOM United States Special Operations Command 
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This work would not have been possible without the compassion and strength 
bestowed on me by my Lord and Savior Jesus Christ. “When you saw only one set of 
footprints in the sand, it was then that I carried you.” 
I would like to thank my wife, my best friend, and my partner in all things, 
Samantha. Your unshakable work ethic was an inspiration to me throughout this process. 
You provided me encouragement at just the right times, a talent of yours for which I am 
forever grateful. 
I would like to thank my mother and father, Ray and Sue. Thanks for believing in 
me, more than I believed in myself at times. You’ve provided me the inspiration to 
accomplish work on this scale. 
I would like to thank my advisors, Dr. Rowe and Dr. Maness. I can’t thank you 
enough for the patience, support, and attention you have given me throughout. The 
process was just as beneficial as the end product. I am a better writer, researcher, and 
student as a direct result of your mentorship. 
I would like to thank members of the special operations community that supported 
my research. Your inputs were the engine for this project. I hope it can benefit you as we 
all carry the mission forward. 
xi 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Special operations forces are part of the Joint Services for missions in hostile and 
politically sensitive environments as defined by Joint Publication 3-5, Special Operations 
(Joint Chiefs of Staff [JCS], 2014). Accordingly, special operations must have 
unconventional and technically advanced capabilities available for their missions to sustain 
their competitive edge over the adversary. Joint Publication 3-5 says that special operations 
should support theater and national objectives, and therefore must complement the 
capabilities of conventional forces assigned to the functional and geographic combatant 
commands. Special operations should not substitute for conventional military forces, but 
should enhance all kinds of warfare in a theater, including those in the cyberspace and 
information domains. Most cyberspace operations are performed by forces assigned to 
United States Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM). Appropriately resourced forces outside 
of USCYBERCOM are also authorized to conduct cyberspace operations. This includes 
force assigned to United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), and other 
military units operating at the tactical edge. 
Cyberspace operations are a vital component today of a nation’s information 
operations and political warfare. Cyberspace operations can be scoped to have operational 
effects at the tactical through strategic levels. Accordingly, special operations forces must 
integrate cyberspace operations into their normal repertoire of capabilities to sustain a 
competitive battlefield advantage. Compared to their conventional military counterparts, 
special operations complete their assigned tasks using tactically focused methods 
underpinned by small-unit operations, technical and cutting-edge capabilities, and other 
factors that enhance speed and lethality of the missions they execute. Special operations 
are typically high-risk, constrained by time, and can be clandestine and covert. To achieve 
their objectives, technical special operations tradecraft must be coupled with non-standard 
capabilities.  
With the emergence of cyberspace as a warfare domain, special operations forces 
no longer have a technology advantage against their peer adversaries, since proximity to 
enemy combatants is unnecessary for the delivery of cyber effects. Although not officially 
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documented, there is a consensus within the Department of Defense (DOD) that special 
operations forces and other military units must unilaterally perform cyberspace operations 
to accomplish tactical objectives, promote unit security, and enhance DOD partner-agency 
missions. These forces lack the operational doctrine, equipment, or trained personnel for 
cyberspace operations by themselves. This thesis examines governing DOD cyberspace 
doctrine for support of unilateral special operations cyberspace operations, DOD partner 
agency support to special operations conduct of cyberspace operations, and USSOCOM 
support of cyberspace operations. 
A. HYPOTHESIS 
Special operations forces cannot perform their own unilateral cyberspace 
operations for several reasons. First, DOD organizations have debated what organizations 
should own the tools and authorities for cyberspace operations. Policy ambiguity by 
USCYBERCOM and the enterprise-level DOD must be overcome to allow special 
operations to meaningfully use cyberspace operations. Second, the special operations 
community needs to build cyberspace-operations capabilities. Recruitment and training of 
personnel familiar with both special operations and cyberspace operations is difficult due 
to the cultural differences between the two communities. Cyber tools designed to support 
special operations must be developed for their unique and low-density missions. Third, 
institutional knowledge is lacking on how special operations can integrate cyberspace 
operations into campaigns. Ground-force commanders are unaware how to request 
cyberspace operations, and how they can complement or enable tactical operations.  
The hypothesis proposed in this thesis is that, if appropriately resourced, special 
operations forces can capitalize on cyberspace operations to achieve tactical and strategic 
objectives and enhance unit safety. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
• How well does current DOD cyber-operations doctrine, partner agency 
support, and man, train, and equip resourcing allow special operations units 
to conduct cyber operations at the required operational pace? Are 
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appropriate technical mechanisms in place to get appropriate and properly 
vetted cyber targets? 
C. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
This research assessed the adequacy of manning and technical capabilities in 
USSOCOM operational units that conduct cyberspace operations. It examined cyberspace-
operation authorities and approval mechanisms for special operations. It examined the 
relationship between USCYBERCOM and USSOCOM, and assessed the level of 
operational support and capability development that USCYBERCOM dedicates to special 
operations. The research also examined doctrinal and resource challenges facing special 
operations units operating at the tactical edge of operations. Specific recommendations are 
made for the policy and resource changes required to modernize USSOCOM’s cyber 
workforce so that USSOCOM units conducting cyberspace operations can assess the 
capability requirements, doctrinal amendments, and level of support needed from partner 
agencies in a modern cyber-warfare capability. 
D. OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis begins with a literature review of cyberspace operations and special 
operations doctrine. This review identifies key institutional issues impeding unilateral 
cyberspace operations in special operations. It highlights USCYBERCOM responsibilities 
to conduct cyberspace operations for partner agencies, and to support cyber warfare 
capability development across the DOD. The literature review identifies previous academic 
work on cyberspace operations for special operations, and locates current gaps in governing 
and academic literature related to the topic. 
We distributed a questionnaire to special operations units to identify operational 
impediments in the cyber warfare domain. An assessment was made on the manning, 
training, and equipment adequacy of special operations cyberspace operators to identify 
deficiencies. The questionnaire was used to guide interviews with special operations units, 
USCYBERCOM entities, and other tactical units on their ability to perform cyberspace 
operations. Its goal was to measure the effectiveness of current USSOCOM cyberspace 
operations and support to current special operations cyberspace operations, and we 
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recommend how to fix specific resource deficiencies. The reporting on these operations 
was also examined to determine if lessons are being learned and operational limitations are 
being resolved. We tried to identify if similar limitations exist for other units operating at 
the tactical edge of maritime, ground, and air domains.  
Chapter II examines the applicability of cyberspace operations doctrine and case 
work for special operations. Chapter III interviews special operations units that conduct 
cyberspace operations for data about mission accomplishment. Chapter IV shows the 
results of the questionnaire and describes current practice. Chapter V gives conclusions 
and recommendations for future work. 
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II. RELATED WORK 
Cyberspace is physical computing components that are logically connected through 
a networked medium. For the DOD, Cyberspace operations include “military, intelligence, 
and ordinary business operations in cyberspace” (JCS, 2018a, p. II-1). Military operations 
in cyberspace can aid a commander’s objective (JCS, 2018a). Examples of their effects 
include force projection against targets in the physical or logical domain, intelligence 
development, and defensive actions to preserve friendly-force networks. Special operations 
differ from conventional military operations, as they require “unique modes of 
employment, tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment” (JCS, 2014, p. I-1). Core 
special operations activities include direct actions against enemy combatants, special-
reconnaissance operations, unconventional warfare, hostage rescue and recovery, counter-
insurgency operations, civil affairs operations, and humanitarian aid. An example of a 
special operations cyber operation could be the manipulation of an adversary surveillance 
system during a direct-action raid. The limited quantity of previous work on tactical 
cyberspace operations, and lack of special operations language in the governing cyber 
doctrine, make it difficult to research cyberspace operations by special operations units. 
Cyberspace is a relatively new warfighting domain. Cyber doctrine, legislation, and 
tactics are dynamic entities, driven by evolving policy and technical considerations. Many 
open-source, academic, and government publications address cyber warfare from a 
strategic perspective. With tight budgets, DOD must address great-power competitions, 
safeguard critical infrastructure, and maintain operations in the cyber domain. Special 
operations cyberspace operations are a lower priority for Pentagon strategists as they are 
not routinely needed in a tactical environment. The lack of tactical-level cyber-operations 
doctrine and a lack of awareness of offensive cyberspace capabilities by warfare 
commanders contribute to this. 
The special operations community has a unique opportunity to shape macro-level 
cyber operational doctrine. Some nations routinely commit cyber-enabled intellectual theft 
and political coercion without following rules of engagement in the cyber domain. Given 
the lack of domestic and international consensus on what is a cyberattack, tactical and 
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granular explorations of cyber warfare are limited. A United Nations consortium of experts 
on international cyber-operations law convened in 2013 to develop the Tallinn Manual 
(Schmitt, 2013). The Tallinn Manual is a working set of international norms and 
governance for cyber warfare. However, the laws are non-binding for members outside of 
the United Nations. Furthermore, as several case studies within it point out, member-
nations routinely conduct cyberspace operations that do not rise to the level of force to 
avoid culpability under the laws. “A cyber-operation constitutes a use of force when its 
scale and effects are comparable to non-cyber operations that include a use of force” 
(Schmitt, 2013, p. 45). Tactical cyberspace operations in destabilizing information 
campaigns are not directly addressed in this work. 
A. CYBER STRATEGY 
The Cyberspace Solarium Commission Report indicates the United States lacks a 
unified strategy for combating public and private attacks in cyberspace (King et al., 2020). 
This deficiency is seen in the gaps related to tactical cyberspace-operations doctrine. 
Nation-state adversaries and violent extremist organizations use effective and low-cost 
cyberspace operations to match the United States technical and financial advantages in 
cyberspace. Due to their close physical placement to adversaries of these types, properly 
equipped special operations forces could combat these threats. The emergence of endpoint 
technologies such as internet-of-things devices, 5G cellular technology, and mesh networks 
suggest special operations forces could be the logical combatant for these targets. The 
report attributes disparate cyber-security strategies among USCYBERCOM, the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency, the public and private sectors, and other 
organizations as a barrier to protecting American interests in cyberspace. It lists several 
factors contributing to why the United States government does not effectively collaborate 
with outside entities. The United States government does not have a declared public policy 
on cyber-attack responses. Exchanging information with the private sector is hampered by 
classification issues. Despite improved guidance from National Security Presidential 
Memorandum (NSPM) 13 that endorses a forward defense posture in cyberspace, many 
government institutions still struggle with securing all interests in cyberspace (White 
7 
House, 2018). These issues compound the unilateral conduct of cyberspace operations by 
special operations forces. 
The report also says “Specifically, DOD should develop the capacity to provide 
decision makers with cyber options, including options to support crisis bargaining and 
response that are independent of and do not rely on existing cyber campaign plans and the 
forces already committed to them” (p. 112). This reaffirms that special operations forces 
must have cyber-warfare options available to accomplish their core activities. It also says 
“A prerequisite to keeping pace with them and anticipating their behavior, rather than 
simply reacting and responding to it, is gaining and maintaining access against defined 
targets and pursuing adversaries as they maneuver” (p. 112). The report also says that the 
National Security Agency’s role as a combat support agency should be supporting Title 10 
and that cyberspace operations at the tactical and operational level should be assessed. 
These statements imply that expeditionary forces, including special operations forces, 
should be properly equipped with cyberspace capabilities. 
B. CYBER OPERATIONS 
In 2009, the DOD established USCYBERCOM to plan offensive and defensive 
cyber warfare. USCYBERCOM was created as a sub-unified combatant command 
subordinate to USSTRATCOM in June 2009, and was elevated to a full unified command 
in August 2018. The cyber domain is increasingly contested due to the ability of many 
nation-states to cheaply and remotely attack military, civilian, and financial infrastructure.  
General DOD guidance calls for U.S. cyber forces to operate alongside land, sea, 
air, and space forces. Joint Publications governing cyberspace operations and special 
operations identify methods and terms for warfare (JCS, 2014). However, doctrine does 
not specifically identify how cyber will support special operations. Another publication 
says that cyberspace operations can support air, land, maritime, space, and special 
operations (JCS, 2018a). However, it does not explain how to request operational support 
or technical-capability development. 
The U.S. DOD cyberspace operations doctrine is in Joint Publication 3-12 (JCS, 
2018a). It describes military operations in the cyberspace domain and identifies DOD 
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combat forces, intelligence agencies, and support entities that plan, approve, and execute 
cyberspace operations. The organizations identified are members of the military 
intelligence community with large-scale operational technology that can be used in 
strategic operations. The doctrine discusses the integration and synchronization of 
cyberspace capabilities across a range of military operations, and identifies the roles and 
responsibilities of the other combatant commanders to ask for USCYBERCOM 
capabilities. 
Joint Publication 3-12 highlights several issues necessary to fully integrate 
cyberspace operations into joint targeting. These include the need for centralized planning 
to synchronize cyberspace operations with kinetic operations and fires in the operational 
environment, de-confliction between government entities, and a thorough understanding 
of cyberspace-operations planning by commanders. If multiple agencies have the same 
target in cyberspace, uncoordinated actions could produce reduced effectiveness, lost 
intelligence, unintended detection, or complete compromise of the mission. Tactical 
actions in cyberspace rely on effects that are confined to a local area, but the risk of 
collateral effects is increased in cyberspace. A clearly articulated capability deficiency that 
outlines the need to conduct cyberspace operations below the combatant-command level 
could be entered into the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS). 
Cyberspace operations vary in their function and intent. Special operations could 
significantly help the Joint Targeting Cycle (JTC) with remote cyberspace operations. One 
publication calls for offensive maneuvers such as cyberspace attack to be synchronized and 
de-conflicted during targeting (JCS, 2018a). However, it says that USCYBERCOM is in 
charge of joint targeting in cyberspace, and does not address the similar capabilities of 
USSOCOM. This omission leaves a considerable gap in the chain of responsibility among 
Joint Services for cyberspace operations. 
Cyberspace is part of the information environment that affects all parts of physical 
warfighting. Special operations forces can include cyberspace operations among their 
specialized capabilities to expand their commanders’ offensive options, enhance unit 
security, and achieve both tactical and strategic cyber effects. Cyberspace operations can 
affect the physical and logical components of an adversarial computer system, or target 
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data in computer systems by modifying it. Effects can be logical or physical. An 
appropriate comparison between physical and logical effects are the 2014 Office of 
Personnel Management data breach versus the 2010 Stuxnet attacks. U.S. Government 
personnel data was stolen from the Office of Personnel Management on a massive scale by 
Chinese actors, and it had a logical effect (Office of Personnel Management, n.d.). The 
2010 Stuxnet attacks targeted a Siemens programmable logic controller in an Iranian 
nuclear facility and the physical process of uranium refinement, so it had a physical effect 
(Hughes, 2018, Chapter 6, p. 80, para. 3).  
The “cyber persona layer” of cyberspace is information that identifies a person by 
email addresses, online login credentials, and IP addresses. Exploitation of it can enable 
access to physical and logical components of an adversary computer system independent 
of the scale of the target. Operational cyber technology applied by special operations units 
could develop targets and enable cooperation with USCYBERCOM entities better 
equipped to handle larger-scale problems discovered at the tactical level. 
Militaries can use cyberspace operations to influence the information environment 
in an integrated campaign. Since 2007, peer adversaries of the United States have 
conducted cyber operations and information wars to achieve their national interests. The 
2007 Russian attacks against Estonia were the first known use of a cyber-capability to 
achieve a strategic effect, when the Russian government and civilian hackers temporarily 
hurt the Estonian government and the country’s financial infrastructure (Conner and 
Vogler, 2017). In 2013, Russia combined cyber operations, electronic warfare, and 
information operations while invading Ukraine. They used an integrated information-
operations campaign to target Ukrainian-soldier communications and Ukrainian military 
networks; denial of service, social-media manipulation, and interception of 
communications disrupted basic Ukrainian military operations (Brantly et al., 2017). 
Russia coupled their tactical information-operation efforts with wide-scale disinformation 
campaigns. They paid millions to troll-farms to post pro-Russian messages on social media 
sites, blogs, and forums that were critical of Russian actions (Duggan, 2015). These 
combined operations greatly overmatched their Ukrainian adversaries without provoking a 
Western military response.  
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Cyberspace operations by the Combatant Commanders and the Joint Services can 
also affect the logical and physical warfighting domains (JCS, 2018a). These operations 
include offensive cyberspace operations, defensive cyberspace operations, and DOD 
information-network operations (DODIN). Offensive cyberspace operations try to deny, 
degrade, or destroy physical or virtual infrastructure to achieve military objectives. A Title 
10 military offensive cyberspace operation is defined as a mission, conducted outside of 
friendly-force cyberspace, which exhibits an intent other than defending that space against 
an imminent threat. It targets adversarial computing capabilities in the logical and physical 
domains. An offensive action can target a single electronic device or an entire military 
information system. The effect can range from denial of service against a wireless device 
to a complex network infiltration to sustain an undetected presence. The tactical 
environments of special operations forces suit small-scale cyberspace operations, but the 
forces could aid cyberspace target refinement and handoff for cyber operations that have 
strategic implications. The recent 2018 revocation of Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 
20 and its replacement with NSPM-13 could signal a change in United States cyber 
strategy. Recent overt cyber-operation actions by the United States against Russia 
(Balmforth, 2019) show a shift towards forward defense and persistent engagement, 
consistent with the updated 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy. Special operations forces could 
capitalize on this shift in policy that might aid tactical-level cyberspace operations. 
Defensive cyberspace operations can defend military information systems from 
threats in cyberspace (JCS, 2018a). The USCYBERCOM Cyber Protection Force protects 
the DODIN and related cyberspace. The physical infrastructure and accompanying 
personnel required to defend a military network are beyond the scope of what special 
operations forces can do, so we will not discuss them. 
The DOD and intelligence agencies also perform cyberspace operations for theater 
and national-intelligence priorities (JCS, 2018a). Intelligence functions in cyberspace are 
typically Title 50 operations and can be conducted by either military personnel or civilians. 
The National Security Agency provides intelligence support to cyberspace operations at 
the tactical and operational levels.  
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C. SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND CYBER OPERATIONS 
Doctrine (JCS, 2018a) does not specifically identify how USCYBERCOM will 
support USSOCOM, the organization that mans, trains, and equips special operations 
forces and provides combat forces to the geographical combatant commanders. The 
responsibility of providing forces while manning, training, and equipping is unique to 
USSOCOM (JCS, 2014). USSOCOM also has its own cyberspace capabilities. Thus, 
support mechanisms between USCYBERCOM and USSOCOM must be specified. 
Previous work identified a lack of organic cyberspace-operations manning and 
technical capabilities at the U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) (Rivera, 
2019.) Special operations forces below the combatant-command level do not have a 
permanent cyber-workforce assigned to their force structure. The other branches of the 
Joint Service are experiencing the same deficiency, which will be discussed in Chapter III. 
Rivera identified that USCYBERCOM cannot dedicate resources to supporting tactical-
cyberspace operations. There is a gap in the ability to conduct tactical-level cyberspace-
operations despite the requirement to perform them. 
Special operations forces must thoroughly understand what authorities govern 
cyberspace operations based on the intent of the requested operation. Beyond classification 
issues, cyberspace operations can use the same commands to accomplish Title 50 
intelligence missions as they do for Title 10 offensive missions. Scanning, enumeration, 
sustaining a presence on a network, installing payloads, and other operations can straddle 
the line between Title 10 and Title 50 based on degree of intrusiveness, political sensitivity, 
risk of detection, collateral effects, and other considerations. Once a mission planner can 
determine the relevant authorities, the approval chains diverge for intelligence gathering 
versus offensive effects, and civilians cannot perform most offensive actions in cyberspace 
that rise to the level of force. Another issue is that Title 10 operations require an approved 
CONOP (concept of operation) to execute at the strategic and operational levels, but the 
authority for Title 10 cyberspace operations is held by Operational Orders (OPORD) and 
Fragmentary Orders (FRAGO) at the geographic combatant-command level. Depending 
on sensitivity of the offensive operation and its potential collateral effects, the CONOP 
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may require a higher approval level than that of a local commander. Hence, offensive 
cyberspace operations may be slow to execute. 
Special operations missions can be amplified by cyberspace operations (Duggan & 
Oren, 2016). Targeting in the cyber domain can enhance the lethality of direct-action 
missions. Increased connectivity resulting from networked warfare at the tactical level can 
promote trust and interoperability with partner forces. Cyberspace operations can help 
special operations forces interpret events and recognize disinformation. These types of 
cyberspace operations require the unique access and placement of special operations 
forces.  
All commanders now can consider requesting or conducting cyberspace operations 
to aid their missions. The Commander of USCYBERCOM is the coordinating authority 
for cyberspace operations that defend DOD networks and military cyberspace operations 
in adversarial cyberspace (JCS, 2018a). The National Security Agency is tasked with 
signals-intelligence and cyber-security support to USCYBERCOM. For theater-specific 
cyberspace operations, USCYBERCOM can be either the supporting or supported 
commander. This means that it must support commanders requiring cyberspace operations 
to achieve their objectives. Conversely, units at the tactical edge of operations must support 
USCYBERCOM if they can; their operations do routinely place them near adversarial 
cyber targets. 
1. Administrative Obstacles 
A challenge for integration of cyberspace and conventional operations is that 
personnel planning the technical details of a cyberspace operation may not understand its 
contribution to a larger military campaign, and commanders may not know how to request 
and integrate cyber effects into their campaigns. One article attributes this disconnect to 
weaknesses in professional military education on both sides (Bender, 2013). 
USCYBERCOM has the responsibility to educate their technical experts on how to 
integrate cyber maneuvers into the operational military culture and to develop a curriculum 
within professional military education. 
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Previous work examined how well USSOCOM’s resources for special operations 
and cyber operations addressed the current operating environment (Tebedo, 2016). It 
concluded that special operations require additional internal or external capabilities, but 
could not determine if USCYBERCOM could provide them. It also investigated whether 
the core USSOCOM missions of precision strikes and special warfare could be improved 
through cyberspace operations. It concluded that they could, and made a case for using the 
asymmetric nature of cyberspace operations to strengthen the twelve kinds of surgical 
strikes to include direct action, special reconnaissance, counterinsurgency operations, and 
the remaining core activities. It also argued that cyber operations are ineffective unless they 
are coupled with action in the physical domain. 
Another question examined by Tebedo was whether USCYBERCOM’s support 
teams sufficed for cyber support to special operations, but the analysis was inconclusive. 
It does recommend that if USSOCOM needed an internal cyberspace-operations capability, 
reorganization of an existing special operations unit would be the best option, given 
budgetary constraints (Tebedo, 2016). They suggested reorganizing USASOC Civil 
Affairs Brigade into a USSOCOM cyber team. Clearly, barriers to special operations forces 
efficiently conducting cyberspace operations exist. DOD-wide policy limitations, disparate 
operational strategies, and lack of institutional knowledge are contributing factors. 
USCYBERCOM is focused on warfare against nation-state adversaries and its resources 
are committed to sustaining a competitive advantage in strategic operations. DOD doctrine 
incompletely specifies how special operations forces and other units operating at the 
tactical edge should perform cyberspace operations. A declared policy on how the United 
States should approach cyber security and cyberspace operations is lacking. Congress, the 
public sector, and private industry agree that a broad approach is needed to combat the 
diverse threats found in cyberspace. 
2. Targeting Limitations 
Targeting in the cyber domain is not a refined process within the DOD, since cyber 
munitions are not guaranteed to be reliable. Adversaries patch system vulnerabilities 
through periodic updates, and adapt to the tactics, techniques, and procedures used against 
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them, as the DOD and National Intelligence Community do in response to attacks. Given 
these considerations, sustaining a competitive advantage in the cyber domain is challenging 
on a small scale. 
Geographic combatant commands and USCYBERCOM follow the Joint Targeting 
Cycle, which puts targets into the theater campaign plan. Targets are nominated based on 
the planning and intelligence considerations for the theater of operations. Intelligence 
functions such as the Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 
(JIPOE), country assessments, and threat assessments are used (JCS, 2018b). This 
information refines the Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIR), which 
support decision-making at all levels within the theater. The Combatant Commander then 
directs operations by subordinate commanders against the vetted targets.  
Geographic Combatant Commanders nominate targets based on the intelligence, 
including those in the cyber domain. However, when the Combatant Commander does not 
unilaterally own the forces that can strike a cyber-target within their theater, a request must 
be generated for support from outside functional commanders like USCYBERCOM. 
Although the Geographic Combatant Commander may wish to fire against a target in their 
theater, they may not have complete authority to do so if using a cyber capability.  
For example, the Combatant Commander can nominate a country’s cellular 
infrastructure for targeting if it is used for enemy command and control and thus can be 
considered a legitimate target. A cellular infrastructure is a networked system containing 
transceiver stations, gateways, and potentially millions of user devices, all of which are 
potential targets. The infrastructure could be targeted on a large scale by destroying control 
centers and major relay points within the network using kinetic means such as a strike-
warfare capability. The Combatant Commander could authorize this and conduct the 
operation with forces assigned to the theater. Alternatively, the infrastructure could be 
targeted by cyber means through its connection to the Internet; the connection could be 
interrupted, taking the system offline temporarily or permanently, or malicious code could 
be injected at the user level to propagate upstream to vital network nodes. The Combatant 
Commander must request support from outside entities to do this. This additional 
coordination may impede timely execution of a mission.  
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3. Collateral Limitations 
Another challenge with targeting is that a target like the cellular network is used by 
enemy actors, but it is also part of a country’s legitimate communications network used for 
commerce, government administration, emergency services, and other routine 
communications. The virtual battlespace is challenging to separate from innocent use by 
civilians. This differs from targeting in the physical domain, where military objectives can 
be more clearly isolated. Joint targeting doctrine requires that force be proportionate, 
timely, and minimize collateral effects against non-combatants. A carefully engineered 
cyber-munition is more likely to achieve this. Therefore, a cyber capability must be suitably 
complex for use in the intended target environment, and must balance legal considerations 
with effectiveness against the enemy. 
4. Technical Limitations 
The reliability of cyber capabilities must be factored into their use by special 
operations forces. Capabilities depend on hardware vulnerabilities, software 
vulnerabilities, and human vulnerabilities. Cyber operators exploit those found in network 
appliances, end-user devices, and internet-of-things devices. The degree of success in 
exploitation varies depending on how often users update operating systems and application 
software. The more actively is a networked managed, the lower the probability of success 
in its exploitation. If the network is actively managed, detection by the adversary is more 
likely. In a time-constrained environment, tactical forces would need capabilities that are 
suitable for the speed of special warfare. Cyberspace operations requiring a sustained 
network presence and time-consuming technical development are better suited for 
strategically aligned and equipped forces. USCYBERCOM is best postured to make the 
decision whether cyberspace operations can proceed, as it performs the bulk of DOD 
intelligence missions in cyberspace. Accurate cyber threat intelligence is required to 
understand enemy capabilities, courses of action, and behaviors in both the physical and 
logical domains (Dickinson, 2016, para. 3). This process shapes future offensive and 
defensive cyberspace operations (Dickinson, 2016, para. 4). Under USCYBERCOM, the 
Commanders of the Joint Forces Headquarters-Cyber refine intelligence requirements, 
16 
provide tactical courses of action, and integrate cyberspace operations into theater 
campaigns (JCS, 2018a). Joint Publication 3-12 directs the other combatant commands to 
integrate cyberspace capabilities into military operations by coordinating with 
USCYBERCOM. Absent narrow, theater-specific guidance, USCYBERCOM has the final 
say regarding the feasibility of cyberspace operations, even if the adversarial cyber-target 
exists in the physical space of a geographic combatant command. USSOCOM forces and 
the geographic combatant commands they are assigned to would have to seek legal advice 
from a Judge Advocacy Group to pursue operations not approved by USCYBERCOM. 
USSOCOM forces could propose alternative actions based on cyber threat intelligence 
produced by USCYBERCOM, and operational intelligence produced through other means. 
17 
III. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS AND RESULTS 
A. QUESTIONNAIRE  
A questionnaire was developed to examine how well special operations forces are 
formulating and executing cyberspace operations. The questions are broadly focused on 
the authorities, capabilities, and resourcing that special operations forces require to conduct 
cyberspace operations. The questions also address cyberspace-operations support by 
entities outside of USSOCOM. 
Our distribution of the questionnaire to USSOCOM program offices, special 
operations units, USCYBERCOM, and combat support agencies such as the National 
Security Agency, identified factors that impede cyberspace operations by special 
operations forces. It identified USCYBERCOM entities responsible for providing 
cyberspace-operations support to special operations activities, and assessed the 
effectiveness of that support. The assessment also examined the level of reporting fidelity 
maintained for these operations, and tried to identify similar obstacles for other military 
units. 
The questionnaire consisted of two parts and is provided in Appendix A and 
Appendix B. Ten questions focused on cyberspace operations that special operations forces 
perform; eight questions focused on cyberspace operations that USCYBERCOM performs 
for the special operations community. The questionnaire was sent to participants between 
April 2020 and May 2020, and responses were received between April 2020 and September 
2020. 
B. QUESTIONS FOR USCYBERCOM AND SUBORDINATE ELEMENTS 
The questionnaire was delivered to the USCYBERCOM J2 Intelligence Division, 
and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER). Although some responses to the 
questionnaire were unclassified, responses about specific operational metrics related to 
cyberspace operations and special operations are held at SECRET level enclaves in the 
Supplemental to this thesis. All responses from MARFORCYBER are held at the SECRET 
level.  
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1. USCYBERCOM J2 Intelligence Division Questionnaire Responses 
The questionnaire was forwarded to the J2 Intelligence Division of 
USCYBERCOM at Fort Meade, Maryland. Mr. Dave Wilson of the J2 Intelligence 
Division fielded the request for information. The responses were provided on 
UNCLASSIFIED and SECRET enclaves, where appropriate. During an unclassified phone 
conversation, Mr. Wilson said USCYBERCOM performs computer network operations 
and computer network exploitation to shield deployed tactical units from operational risk 
(D. Wilson, personal communication, July 21, 2020). He said that USCYBCERCOM 
provides historical cyberspace-operations context to military customers to prepare them for 
deployment to an area of operations. Operational support and capability development for 
USSOCOM is provided by MARFORCYBER, the Marine Corps service component 
commander for USCYBERCOM. 
2. Title 10 and Title 50 Authorities 
Mr. Wilson reaffirmed that Title 10 and Title 50 of the U.S. Code are the primary 
governing mechanism for cyberspace operations. However, conflicts exist between 
Congressional committees that monitor Title 10 military operations and Title 50 
intelligence operations (Wall, 2011). These conflicts contribute to the difficulties military 
units experience during the performance of cyberspace operations, as the governing U.S. 
codes do not differentiate well between military operations and intelligence activities in 
cyberspace. 
Mr. Wilson explained the differences between Title 10 and Title 50 of the U.S. 
Code, as they pertain to oversight of cyberspace operations. Title 10 of the U.S. Code 
empowers the executive branch of government to review and approve military operations, 
but it can delegate approval authority to operational commanders. The Congressional 
Armed Forces Committee in the legislative branch receives reports on military operations 
and performs oversight of military operations. Title 50 of the U.S. Code governs the 
conduct of intelligence activities, and requires that congressional intelligence committees 
be kept well-informed of intelligence activities. Intelligence activities are done by the 
National Intelligence Program, which includes the Director of National Intelligence, the 
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Central Intelligence Agency, and any other program or department designated by the 
President of the United States. Congressional intelligence committees provide oversight of 
intelligence activities. Intelligence activities can also be done by DOD under the authority 
of the Secretary of Defense. The Congressional Armed Services Committee and the 
Congressional Intelligence Committee share oversight when DOD performs intelligence 
activities (Wall, 2011). 
3. Title 10, Title 50, and Unconventional Warfare 
Mr. Wilson provided a reference that further differentiated between Title 10 and 
Tile 50 of the U.S. Code. The document used a comparison between cyberspace operations 
and unconventional warfare. The distinction between Title 10 and Title 50 cyberspace 
operations is similar to the distinction between unconventional warfare and covert actions 
(Wall, 2011). Joint Publication 3-5 defines unconventional warfare as “operations or 
activities done by special operations forces, to enable a resistance movement or insurgency 
to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or 
with an underground, auxiliary, and guerilla force in a denied area.” Title 50 of the U.S. 
Code defines a covert action as “an activity of the U.S. government to influence political, 
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the U.S. 
government not be apparent or openly acknowledged.” Differences reflect the authority 
ordering the operation and whether the operation is acknowledged by the U.S. Government. 
If the operation is directed by a military commander, and is intended to be acknowledged 
by the United States Government, it is considered unconventional warfare and a military 
action. If the operation is directed by the Director of National Intelligence, and is not 
intended to be acknowledged by the United States Government, then it is a covert action. 
Congressional intelligence committees are concerned that DOD is labeling certain 
cyberspace operations as military activities to avoid more stringent oversight requirements. 
The DOD is not required to inform Congressional armed-services committees about 
military operations. 
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C. QUESTIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNITS 
The special operations portion of the questionnaire was distributed to the 
USSOCOM J3 Cyber Division, and their subordinate operational commands. It contained 
questions on operational metrics, achieving operational objectives, requests for support 
from DOD cyberspace-operations agencies, and manning and equipment levels. As before, 
responses about specific operational metrics related to cyberspace operations and special 
operations are in the classified supplemental.  
The questionnaire was also sent to the J3 Cyber Division of USSOCOM in Tampa 
Bay, Florida, the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) 361st Technical 
Directorate in Destin, Florida, the Joint Cyber Operations Group at Fort Meade, Maryland, 
and the Naval Special Warfare Special Reconnaissance Teams. The Joint Cyber Operations 
Group responses are in the classified supplemental. Operational metrics provided by the 
Special Reconnaissance Teams are in the classified supplemental. 
1. USSOCOM J3 Cyber Division Questionnaire Responses 
The questionnaire was forwarded to the USSOCOM J3 Cyber Division as a request 
for information. Although the USSOCOM J3 Cyber Division supports offensive, 
defensive, and routine DOD cyberspace operations, only questions related to offensive 
cyberspace operations were asked. The USSOCOM J3 Cyber Division provided the 
following responses, but due to need-to-know restrictions, questions about current and 
future operations were not answered.  
a. Authorities 
The first question asked, “Are cyber authorities granted in time to enable 
operations?” According to Lieutenant Commander Tyrone Pham of the USSOCOM J3 
Cyber Division (personal communication, July 8, 2020), the required authorities are in 
place, but occasional operational permission roadblocks and interagency de-confliction 
issues have delayed cyberspace operations.  
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b. Support from the interagency 
USSOCCOM also partially answered question three, “Was support requested and 
provided from outside agencies such as USSCYBERCOM and the National Security 
Agency?” USSOCOM could request support from USCYBERCOM and the National 
Security Agency for cyber capability development, technical expertise, and operational 
coordination. USCYBERCOM and the geographic and functional combatant commanders 
have installed coordination elements in their respective organizations. The Cyberspace 
Operations Integrated Planning Element (CO-IPE) is a USCYBERCOM support team 
embedded at combatant commands. The Joint Cyber Center is a combatant-commander-
owned team embedded in their planning staff. USCYBERCOM CO-IPE teams were 
formed in September 2017, and should be fully capable by 2022 (Pomerleau, 2019, para. 
8). Organizational relationships of the CO-IPE teams are described in Joint Publication 
3-12, and relationships between the CO-IPE and USCYBERCOM subordinate commands 
are specified by USCYBERCOM orders. The CO-IPE teams coordinate cyberspace-
operations planning between the combatant commander and USCYBERCOM during 
routine and contingency operations. They provide tailored technical advice to the 
combatant commanders, and act as a link to USCYBERCOM.  
The flow of communication from the CO-IPE to USCYBERCOM occurs with the 
combatant-command Joint Cyber Center. The Joint Cyber Centers are cyberspace-
operations advisors to the combatant command to integrate cyberspace operations into a 
theater campaign. Joint Publication 3-12 shows the administrative and operational 
placement of the Joint Cyber Centers, but does not specify their responsibilities to the 
combatant commander. According to (DOD Inspector General, 2014), the U.S. Central 
Command (USCENTCOM) uses their Joint Cyber Center for network defense actions, 
developing and integrating cyberspace operations, and identifying cyber-readiness 
requirements for its forces. The U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) uses their Joint Cyber 
Center for intelligence and operations functions for cyberspace operations.  
According to Lieutenant Commander Pham (personal communication, July 21, 
2020), the USSOCOM Joint Cyber Center has staff from multiple joint-forces codes such 
as the “J-2” intelligence staff, the “J-3” operations staff, and the “J-6” communications 
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staff. The CO-IPE staff also help Joint Cyber Center planning. Staff from the joint-force 
codes and the CO-IPE, DOD. The J6 communications department also integrates cyber 
operations into training events.  
The interview results from the USSOCOM J3 Cyber Center confirm the 
relationship described in Joint Publication 3-12. The CO-IPE gives intelligence and 
recommendations on cyberspace-operation courses of action to the Joint Cyber Center 
during routine and contingency operations (personal communication, July 21, 2020). The 
Joint Cyber Center then provides the courses of action to the combatant commander for 
integration into the larger theater campaign. The Joint Cyber Centers and CO-IPEs have 
yet to standardize their relationships, likely due to their relative organizational immaturity 
compared to USCYBERCOM. The USSOCOM Joint Cyber Center relationships with CO-
IPEs are the most mature among the combatant commanders due to the co-location of 
USCYBERCOM Cyber Protection Teams within the USSOCOM Joint Cyber Center, and 
the CO-IPE personnel distribution among the USSOCOM owned Joint Special Operations 
Command and Theater Special Operations Commands. USSOCOM is the only combatant 
commander with geographically embedded Theater Special Operations Commands that 
partition cyber planning within their force structure. For example, the USCENTCOM 
Theater Special Operations Command established direct communications through the 
USCENTCOM Joint Cyber Center using a liaison officer (T. Pham, personal 
communication, July 21, 2020). This is a unique relationship between Theater Special 
Operations Commands and Joint Cyber Centers. USCENTCOM relies heavily on special 
operations for their campaigns, so special operations cyberspace operations are well 
represented in larger USCENTCOM campaign plans. Special operations forces are 
considered as autonomous, and have defined their Joint Cyber Center role when lacking 
guidance.  
c. Resourcing of cyber operations 
The second response from the USSOCOM J3 Cyber Center addressed part of 
question 2, “Are cyber forces within USSOCOM and their respective sister service 
enterprises 100% resourced in Manning, Training, and Equipment?” According to 
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Lieutenant Commander Pham (personal communication, July 8, 2020), one obstacle is that 
research and development has been closely monitored by Congress for duplication across 
DOD. USSOCOM has succeeded in justifying its research and development funding, but 
the associated substantiating research and justifications have delayed new capabilities. The 
federal government uses the Networking and Information Technology Research and 
Development Program (NITRD) to recommend investments in cybersecurity, software 
engineering, and other information technology areas (Sargent, 2020). Current increasing 
investment trends in DOD information-technology research and development could 
support new cyberspace-operations capabilities for USSOCOM. 
d. Artificial intelligence for special operations 
Special operations forces can use organizations outside of USSOCOM to refine 
cyberspace-operations capabilities. The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is the DOD 
center of excellence for artificial-intelligence delivery. Artificial intelligence can enhance 
tactical and operational level cyberspace operations for special operations forces.  
The National Defense Industrial Association is an educational nonprofit 
organization that promotes innovation in technology and processes (National Defense 
Industrial Association, n.d.). It hosted a webinar about artificial intelligence in irregular 
warfare and low-intensity conflicts. Its Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 
division in particular is developing artificial intelligence solutions for tactical-unit 
maneuvers (Hudson, 2020). Artificial intelligence in special operations could reduce 
human effort to prepare the battlefield for conflict. It could reduce the cognitive load on 
analysts, cyber-operations personnel, and battlefield operators, allowing better-informed 
decisions during combat. It can also be used for cyberspace-operations planning. The 
artificial-intelligence initiative Artificial Intelligence for Small Unit Maneuver (AISUM) 
will improve access by special operations forces to targets (National Defense Industrial 
Association, 2020) by combining special operations and conventional warfighting 
capabilities. An AISUM future-capabilities video showed surface combatants, amphibious 
combatants, intelligence platforms, and special operations forces collaborating in an 
artificial-intelligence-enabled common operational picture. AISUM will allow special 
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operations forces to plan, train, and rehearse in a three-dimensional version of the operating 
environment, using unmanned aerial systems navigating to an objective without relying on 
Global Positioning System data. Object detection algorithms will be enhanced by video 
navigation and signals intelligence. AISUM can also provide a tactical maneuver element 
(Morris, 2020) and, for cyber-operations target development, persistent cyberspace 
operations in a denied or degraded communications environment could occur without 
human-analyst intervention. Also, autonomous intelligence assessment could be forwarded 
to the ground-force operator. 
Artificial intelligence can be used in special operations for predictive maintenance 
(Hughes, 2020), but it can also enable small unit maneuvers, provide quicker decision 
making, and preserve the life of the force on the battlefield. However, requirements for 
artificial intelligence must be described clearly and appropriately in the Defense 
Acquisition System. These requirements include uniform data storage, system 
interoperability, and data security. 
Artificial-intelligence-based cyberspace operations could contribute to special 
operations by automating the collection, processing, and fusion of cyberspace data (Breede, 
2020). Reducing dependence on intelligence communications tethered to a remote 
processing station could not only speed decision making for the tactical operator, but could 
support communications in a difficult environment. The next generation of drones should 
possess artificial intelligence to classify objects and discriminate threats in real time 
(Babbitt, 2020). The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is working to extend such 
warfighting capabilities (Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, n.d.). For example, the U.S. 
Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) is developing small aerial systems that 
can navigate autonomously indoors. The Center also created the Cyber National Mission 
Initiative (Joint Artificial Intelligence Center, 2019) which focuses on network mapping, 
anomaly detection, autonomous cyber defense, and other threat detection tasks difficult for 
human beings.  
Data standardization will be important for artificial-intelligence integration in 
special operations. No DOD standard ontology for data collection and storage exists 
(Hughes, 2020) and this will be important for warfighting tools such as rifles, combat 
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vehicles, and battlefield equipment. A standard application interface could enable sharing 
of data in a unified database format, and the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is working 
on this. Standardization also means that hardware and software must use open architectures 
and interfaces that allow system interoperability, and document their implementations 
thoroughly.  
2. USAFSOC Questionnaire Responses 
The questionnaire was also sent to the United States Air Force 361st Technical 
Directorate, a division of AFSOC. Its mission is to “organize, train, and equip to provide 
special operations forces mission partners with decision advantage through timely, 
accurate, and relevant situational awareness.” It permits air commandos to do special 
operations intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) for worldwide missions. It 
also provides cyberspace-operations support to the Air Force and Joint Forces attached to 
USSOCOM-aligned Theater Special Operations commands. 
a. Authorities  
The 361st Technical Directorate also supports Air Force and Joint Force elements 
attached to the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), a combatant command 
subordinate to USSOCOM. For the question “Are cyber authorities granted in time to 
enable operations?,” they said that authorization of cyberspace operations is now more 
readily granted than in previous years (J. Copp and B. Shaffel, personal communication, 
July 29, 2020). Since 2018, AFSOC operational elements have become more familiar with 
procedures to gain approval, and USCYBERCOM appears to have become more 
comfortable with approving offensive cyberspace operations. 
b. Resourcing of cyberspace operations  
The next questions were, “Are cyber forces within USSOCOM and their respective 
sister service enterprises 100% resourced in manning?” and “Is a training program in place 
and accessible to educate special operations personnel on the conduct of cyberspace 
operations?” According to AFSOC, their special operations community has trouble getting 
personnel qualified to perform cyberspace operations because no billet requirements are in 
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the Program Objective Memorandum (J. Copp and B. Shaffel, personal communication, 
July 29, 2020). Commanders compensate by typically assigning cyberspace-operations 
responsibilities as a collateral duty to intelligence and signals intelligence subject-matter 
experts, as the fields are related to cyberspace operations.  
c. Support from the interagency 
For the question “Is support requested and provided from outside agencies such as 
USSCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency?,” AFSOC said that SIGINT and 
cyberspace-operations partner agencies have increased operational and intelligence sharing 
since 2018 (J. Copp and B. Shaffel, personal communications, July 29, 2020). This is likely 
due to the shift in cyberspace-operations policy and more familiarity with tactical-
cyberspace operations offered by USCYBERCOM. Tactical-level operations for 
operational-level and strategic-level goals have a well-defined process in Joint Publication 
5-0, Joint Operations (JCS, 2017); USCYBERCOM can approve certain tactical-level 
cyberspace operations. AFSOC said that coordination between USCYBERCOM and 
tactical-level agencies appears to be improving. A Joint Priority Effects List does not exist 
for cyberspace operations. A Joint Priority Effects List could assign cyberspace operations 
to the appropriate tactical, operational, or strategic organization, and ease staffing 
constraints. 
3. Naval Special Warfare Special Reconnaissance Team TWO Responses 
The Naval Special Warfare Special Reconnaissance Teams perform combat and 
intelligence support for special operations forces. They prepare the environment, gather 
intelligence and reconnaissance, and provide combat support. For the question “Are cyber 
authorities granted in time to enable operations?” the Naval Special Warfare response was 
similar to that of AFSOC. Cyberspace-operation approvals were reported to be easier to 
get due to increased familiarity with tactical-level requests on behalf of the geographic 
combatant commanders, and due to improved staffing mechanisms between these 
commanders and USCYBERCOM (H. Gage, personal communication, July 31, 2020). 
For the questions “Are cyber forces within USSOCOM and their respective sister 
service enterprises 100% resourced in manning?” and “Is a training program in place and 
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accessible to educate special operations personnel on the conduct of cyberspace 
operations?,” no cyberspace-operations billets were reported to be codified. Commanders 
perform cyberspace operations by repurposing personnel into cyber roles. Training 
requirements and courses of instruction to qualify cyberspace-operations personnel are in 
development. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In summary, the interview responses indicated that cyberspace-operations 
permissions are becoming easier to get as approval authorities become more familiar with 
these operations. Permissions for offensive operations are also becoming easier to obtain 
due to revised executive-branch guidance. Nonetheless, lack of necessary manning and 
equipment in JCIDS is delaying capability development. At the moment, cyberspace-
operations personnel are being taken from existing billets. Cyberspace-operations 
integration below the strategic level is inefficient due to new advisory capabilities at the 
combatant command level. 
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IV. FINDINGS 
This chapter summarizes key impediments to special operations forces ability to 
conduct cyberspace operations that were discovered in the questionnaire. The DOD is 
adequately equipped to perform cyberspace operations at the strategic level using the 
operational forces of USCYBERCOM and the planning elements resident at the combatant 
commands. The DOD is authorized to conduct cyberspace operations below the strategic 
level, and has forces capable of performing such operations. The roles and responsibilities 
of these forces in cyberspace are unclear. This chapter provides justification for organizing 
the cyberspace-operational doctrine, resourcing, and structure of forces that operate below 
the strategic level. 
A. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS 
Special operations forces must develop capabilities that address the scope of their 
operational environment, and that will be effective against the type of enemy they routinely 
encounter. Unique issues are associated with tactical-level cyberspace-operation 
capabilities. Unlike strategically-focused cyberspace operations, special operations forces 
often operate near the enemy, and this exposes their personnel to increased risk of injury 
or death. Their cyber capabilities should focus on providing advanced indications and 
warnings and increasing standoff distance from the enemy. This focus will also affect 
missions at the strategic level. 
The DOD has not clearly defined the roles and responsibilities of cyber-operations 
personnel operating below the strategic level. A mature cyber force should have command 
and personnel alignments capable of a wide array of operations. Tactical commanders 
should be educated on how to use the unique capabilities of cyber operations to 
complement national security goals.  
Complex operations that require long lead times and persistent engagement are not 
suitable for special operations. Special operations need not attack the adversary’s entire 
network. Instead, they can target critical vulnerabilities associated with an operational 
center of gravity. A special operations cyberspace capability could develop intelligence 
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against and locally prosecute the single cyberspace nodes in tactical environments. Access 
to adversary technology such as cellular telephones, laptops, and tactical communication 
networks could enable discovery of enemy intentions or disable their communications. 
Russia used these tactics to great effect during their invasion of the Crimean Peninsula; 
they impeded the Ukrainian military’s ability to mobilize their troops. 
The targeting cycle could also push cyberspace operations from the strategic level 
to the tactical level. Violent extremist organizations now depend on the Internet for basic 
functionality; for instance, the Islamic State used social-media for recruiting and 
command-and-control. USCYBERCOM and the National Intelligence Community track 
violent extremist organizations movements through cyberspace, but lack forces to act in 
the physical domain. Such operations can be planned through cyberspace, and handed off 
to special operations forces or other tactical units for physical prosecution.  
B. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS BY JOINT SERVICES 
Joint operations have several options for cyberspace operations. USCYBERCOM 
is the functional combatant command in charge of worldwide military cyberspace 
operations It provides intelligence support to military customers at the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of warfare. However, it delegates operational support of 
their mission to the Cyber Mission Forces and Cyber National Mission Forces. They 
indirectly support military customers by the CO-IPE, which advises the combatant 
command at the operational level and connects to strategic elements at USCYBERCOM.  
The Joint Cyber Center is at the combatant command level. It is staffed and 
equipped by the combatant command and advises the Combatant Commander on the 
integration of cyberspace operations into theater operations. Neither the CO-IPE and the 
Joint Cyber Center directly interact with conventional forces or special operations forces 
assigned to an area of operations, so the Joint Cyber Center is important. 
The Cyber Mission Forces and Cyber National Mission Forces within 
USCYBERCOM provide operational support to their assigned geographic and functional 
combatant commands. Service commands provide the personnel for them. 
MARFORCYBER is the Marine Corps component command supporting USSOCOM. 
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ARCYBER supports USCENTCOM and USAFRICOM. AIRFORCYBER supports the 
United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), the United States Strategic 
Command (USTRATCOM), and the United States Transportation Command 
(USTRANSCOM). Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM) and the Navy’s 10th Fleet 
support the Pacific Command (USPACOM) and Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). 
MARFORCYBER has the fewest forces among the service component commands. 
The geographic and expeditionary similarities of the Marine Corps missions to special 
operations missions justify their support of USSOCOM. Additional questionnaire 
responses about MARFORCYBER support to special operations forces are provided in the 
Supplemental. 
Special operations forces and conventional forces can perform some cyberspace 
operations according to theater guidance. At the tactical level, special operations relies 
more heavily on their unique warfighting capabilities than conventional forces do; for 
instance, they require more regional orientation and cultural expertise (JCS, 2014, p. ix). 
Because their work is time-sensitive, and is done in clandestine, covert, and low-visibility 
environments, special operations use signals-intelligence and cyberspace-operation 
capabilities often. Some conventional-force units have their own signals-intelligence 
capabilities, but special operations units rely on it more. Similarly, at the operational and 
strategic level of warfare, special operations forces have more organizations supporting 
cyberspace operations. 
C. CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS BELOW THE STRATEGIC LEVEL 
Cyberspace operations below the strategic level of warfare are managed in many 
ways. The Cyber Mission Forces and Cyber National Mission Forces are owned by 
USCYBERCOM, but act according to geographic and functional command alignments. 
The forces performing cyberspace operations for a combatant command are not directly 
controlled by the Geographic Combatant Commander. Control by USCYBERCOM rather 
than the geographic commander requires additional coordination when units at the tactical 
level need cyber support. This contrasts with the relationship USSOCOM has with 
geographic combatant commanders. The Theater Special Operations Command is a 
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subordinate command of USSOCOM (JCS, 2014, p. ix), and the Secretary of Defense 
assigns operational control of Theater Special Operations Commands and their tactical 
units to the geographic combatant command. 
The CO-IPE and Joint Cyber Centers plan cyber operations, but below the 
geographic combatant command, no entity does. For warfare areas in the physical domain, 
a component commander exists. The Joint Forces Land Component Commander controls 
all military operations on land within the theater of operations; the Joint Forces Maritime 
Component Commander controls operations at sea; the Joint Forces Air Component 
Commander controls operations in the air. Component commanders perform cross-domain 
operations in the physical domain as part of combat operations. The transfer of forces from 
one physical warfighting domain to another is documented in Joint Publications. No Joint 
Forces Cyber Component Commander plans, synchronizes, and executes cyberspace 
operations with other component commanders in the theater. Despite being owned by 
USSOCOM, operational control of Theater Special Operations Commands remains with 
the geographic combatant command. These units have geographic focus and regional 
expertise on special operations within the theater, and include dedicated cyberspace 
operations planning personnel. They can use cyberspace operations at the tactical level, 
and can reach back to the USCYBERCOM support mechanisms at the combatant 
command. It is clear that a void in cyberspace-operations guidance occurs below the 
strategic level. The tactical-level units lack defined budgets that address the manning, 
training, and equipment to perform cyberspace operations due to no official requirement. 
Without a codified budget, operational and tactical-level units must use open-source and 
commercial tools to piece together a cyber capability (Mulder, 2016). The lack of 
coordination between Congressional oversight committees in monitoring Title 10 and Title 
50 operations is another barrier to developing a unified cyberspace operations instruction. 
The governing codes do not differentiate well between military operations and intelligence 





It is clear that cyberspace operations could enhance special operations. The United 
States follows legal processes before conducting cyberspace operations. However, these legal 
processes could be accelerated, and ambiguous policy must be clarified. Conflicting 
cyberspace-operations policies come from many different parts of government, and they 
provide little guidance at the tactical level. As a result, the special operations community 
depends too much on strategic guidance that is inapplicable to tactical-level goals.  
A. OPERATIONAL-LEVEL AND TACTICAL-LEVEL FORCE ALIGNMENT 
We suggest that personnel from the CO-IPE or Joint Cyber Center be moved from the 
strategic level to operational level of the theater, and that a Joint Forces Cyber Component 
Commander be established to oversee the execution of both operational-level and tactical-
level cyberspace operations. The Joint Forces Cyber Component Commander could plan 
operations with the Land, Sea, and Air Component Commanders and special operations task 
forces. They would interface with strategic-level USCYBERCOM elements for requested 
support. A redistribution of strategic-level personnel to theater planning would better help 
tactical units such as special operations forces. 
We also suggest that USCYBERCOM Combat Mission Teams that serve missions 
for geographic combatant commands should be controlled by the Geographic Combatant 
Commander. As with the relationship of USSOCOM to geographic combatant commanders, 
USCYBERCOM could act as a force provider satisfying the military-service responsibilities 
to man, train, and equip forces. Operational-level and tactical-level cyberspace-operations 
priorities would be determined by the commander, and ranked appropriately within their 
theater campaign plan. 
It would also help if the composition and mission of the Joint Cyber Center were 
defined in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Planning, and reflected in Joint Publication 3-12, 
Cyberspace Operations. The billet structure should include offensive positions, defensive 
positions, intelligence personnel in “J-3 intelligence” roles, and personnel in “J-6 
communication” roles. This structure would include capabilities from each cyberspace-
34 
operations functional-mission area. If Joint Cyber Center missions are found to duplicate 
those at the CO-IPE, personnel should be reassigned to the operational and tactical level 
cyberspace-operations units. Special operations units should formulate a problem statement 
about cyberspace operations at the tactical-unit level that is endorsed by combatant 
commanders. It should list missions not accomplished due to capability deficiencies, and how 
appropriate resources would solve the issue. Capability requirements should be developed 
using the Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities 
(DOTMLPF) analytic process and should identify materiel and non-materiel solutions for 
JCIDS.  
B. PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
Commanders of special operations forces need education on the operational use of 
cyberspace operations. They also need to become familiar with operational planning for the 
cyber domain and the technical and intelligence requirements to target in the cyber domain. 
This will allow realistic cyber-operation development, and appropriate scoping of missions. 
USCYBERCOM planning courses should be offered to commanders of special operations 
forces. The curriculum should address joint interoperability of cyber forces, conventional 
forces, and special operations forces. The curriculum should cover support mechanisms in to 
USCYBERCOM, possible cyberspace operations, and cyberspace-operations authorities. 
The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 instituted changes in the command and control 
structure and professionalization standards of the force including the Joint Professional 
Military Education program, and the cyberspace domain should be better represented in its 
curriculum.  
C. CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT 
Special operations forces must be familiar with the full range of cyber operations and 
cyberwarfare including offensive, defensive, and DODIN operations, and open-source and 
commercial-off-the-shelf capabilities for cyberspace operations. They also need to understand 
defensive principles, network topology, traffic analysis, and threat-detection methods.  
35 
Knowledge of artificial intelligence should be included in this, as it can reduce 
workloads for cyberspace operations and apply analytic power to threat recognition. The Joint 
Artificial Intelligence Center can help commanders select technology for artificial-
intelligence enhancement. 
Identification of future cyberspace-operations requirements by the DOTMLPF 
process ensures properly written problem statements in JCIDS. Use of the DOTMLPF process 
to resource a special operations cyber-capability should emphasize doctrine, billeted 
positions, and technical capabilities. The formal medium to document a capability deficiency, 
and request remediation is JCIDS. Entering the problem into JCIDS ensures the capability 
requirement is transparent to the larger special operations community, that efforts aren’t 
duplicated across the DOD, and that future defense-acquisition projects can rely on similar 
research previously addressed by the Defense Acquisition Process. 
D. DOCTRINE 
Tactical-level cyberspace-operations doctrine should reflect inputs from units below 
the strategic level. This means that special operations forces should contribute to Joint 
Publications on special operations targeting, and planning. The relationship between 
geographic and functional commands that can perform cyberspace operations beyond 
USCYBERCOM’s Cyber Mission Forces and Cyber National Mission Forces is not currently 
explained. This does not enable intelligent development, targeting, and operational 
synchronization by commanders outside of USCYBERCOM. If operational-level and 
tactical-level force realignments occur, Joint Publication 3-12 should reflect them. Joint 
Publication 3-5 Special Operations should describe how cyberspace operations fit into special 
operations core activities such as reconnaissance, direct action, unconventional warfare, and 
civil affairs. Joint Publication 5-0 Joint Planning should mention planning and tracking 
considerations for operations that cross physical domains, logical domains, and multiple 
combatant commands. Amendments to joint-forces cyberspace-operations doctrine and the 
National Security Presidential Memorandums should address ambiguity in classifying 
cyberspace operations under Title 10 or Title 50 authorities. Technical terms for cyberspace 
operations should be based on the authorities found in Title 10 and Title 50. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Special operations forces need unilateral cyberspace operations. Better ability to do so 
will equalize competition with peer adversaries already operating in the cyber domain. DOD 
organizations that can do strategic cyber missions can better support the Joint Forces at the 
operational and tactical levels. This requires combining inputs from strategic and tactical 
commanders, the defense industry, the commercial sector, and DOD science and technology 
organizations. 
The recommendations of this thesis can extend to other military units at the tactical 
edge of operations. U.S. Navy surface combatants, subsurface combatants, manned air 
platforms, and unmanned air platforms would benefit from an increased ability to include 
cyberspace operations. U.S. Air Force air platforms would also benefit.  
An increased ability of expeditionary forces to conduct cyberspace operations also 
affects their vulnerabilities and centers of gravity, so defensive cyberspace technologies 
should also be examined. Unfortunately, the traditional centralized infrastructure and manning 
for network defense does not readily scale to the tactical level. Future tactical-level cyberspace 
capabilities should have other ways to obtain robust information-assurance measures, 
operational-security measures, and encryption engineered into hardware and software. Such 
defensive operating procedures for tactical-level cyberspace operations should be endorsed 
by USCYBERCOM and the National Security Agency to ensure best practices are used 
including artificial intelligence. 
Resourcing a capability to meet threats in the cyber domain should be accomplished 
through the DOTMLPF process. Quantitative analysis must be done on the criticality of a 
special operations cyber capability versus competing lines of effort. An assessment must be 
made of the risk associated with not resourcing a special operations cyberspace capability. In 
a budget-constrained environment, special operations leadership must decide how to 
redistribute their budget if a cyber-capability is required but not fully funded. Alternatively, 




APPENDIX A. SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTERVIEW KICK-OFF 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How many special operations missions were planned to enable primary or 
follow-on cyberspace operations for the last three years? 
2. Were the primary or follow-on cyberspace operations mission objectives 
achieved? 
3. Were the requested cyber authorities granted in time to enable the operation? 
4. Was support to the primary or follow-on cyberspace operations requested and 
provided from outside agencies such as the NSA, USCYBERCOM, etc.? 
5. How many enhancing cyberspace operations were integrated into SOF missions 
for the last three calendar years? 
6. Were the enhancing cyberspace operations mission objectives achieved? 
7. Were the special operations mission objectives achieved? If they were not, were 
the cyberspace operations the limiting factor? 
8. Was support to the enhancing cyberspace operations requested and provided 
from outside agencies such as the NSA, USCYBERCOM, etc.? 
9. Were the requested enhancing cyber authorities granted in time to support the 
operation? 
10. Are cyber forces within USSOCOM and their respective sister service 
enterprises 100% resourced in Manning, Training, and Equipment (MTE)? If not, what are 
the deficiency percentages for each category? Specifically, how many billets are gapped? 
Is funding secured to acquire SOF peculiar operational technologies? How many requests 
for SOF peculiar operational technologies went unfulfilled? Is a training program in place 
and accessible to educate SOF personnel on the conduct of cyberspace operations? 
All UNCLASSIFIED and higher classification responses related to operational 
metrics are held on SECRET-level enclaves. 
  
38 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
39 
APPENDIX B. SUPPORT AGENCY INTERVIEW KICK-OFF 
QUESTIONNAIRE 
1. How many special operations forces missions requiring cyberspace operations 
were supported in the last three years? 
2. Were the primary or follow-on cyberspace operations mission objectives 
achieved? 
3. Were the requested cyber authorities requested and granted in time to enable the 
cyber component of the special operation? 
4. How many enhancing cyberspace operations were integrated into special 
operations forces missions for the last three calendar years? 
5. Were the enhancing cyberspace operations mission objectives achieved? 
6. Were the requested enhancing cyber authorities granted in time to support the 
operation? 
7. How many special operations forces initiated cyberspace operations requests 
were disapproved due to insufficient lead time in the last three years? 
8. What level of Research and Development funding and support is directed to 
USSOCOM and its subordinate commands for cyber capability development? 
All UNCLASSIFIED and higher classification responses related to operational 
metrics are held on SECRET-level enclaves. 
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SUPPLEMENTAL 
Additional information for Chapters III, IV, and V is in a classified supplemental 
to this thesis. The supplemental contains details about cyberspace-operations metrics, 
sources, and methods. This supplemental has a SECRET//NOFORN classification. Please 
email inquiries to rresources@nps.edu. 
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